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Although it is accepted that to make a contribution, Information Systems (IS) research 
must be novel and provide utility, these characteristics are insufficient to account for the 
cogency or persuasion that research makes a contribution. Novelty and utility are not 
self-evident and authors need to articulate an argument that their paper makes a 
contribution in relation to the discourse to which it seeks to contribute. We use the 
Habermasian ideal of argumentation to explicate the rhetorical, dialectic, logical and 
socio-institutional dimensions of cogent argument. We use two examples of published 
research to illustrate how these elements can be extended to frame research as a 
contribution in relation to the wider disciplinary matrix. We outline next steps of the 
research and the utility of the framework for researchers, reviewers and editors. 
Keywords:  Argument, Cogency, Research contribution 
Introduction 
That research publications aim to provide intellectual contributes is well accepted. But articulating or 
evaluating a paper’s contribution is often problematic. Historically, the scientific enterprise was 
considered as the discovery of truths about the world. This was accomplished via abstract and formal 
relationships among evidence and hypotheses within the deductive and inductive logics of logical 
empiricism (Rehg 2009). But Kuhn’s (1962) critique of logical empiricism demonstrated that knowledge 
claims are not purely objective and rational, and do not exist independent of the knower and the wider 
disciplinary discourse (Kuhn 1977) in which knowledge is created. Rather, science is an active practice in 
which knowledge claims are scrutinized, critiqued, accepted and rejected. But the lack of an objective 
basis for the scientific production of knowledge creates a challenge for the rationality of science (e.g. Rehg 
2009). For if the formal-logic traditions, which provide rationality to science in terms of deductive and 
inductive logics, cannot provide an account of scientific contribution, from where springs the contribution 
of science itself? 
In Information Systems (IS) and Management Studies there is consensus that the main determinant 
criteria of scientific contributions are novelty and utility (Corley et al. 2011). Specific approaches to 
achieving novelty are described in terms of clarifying constructs, states and boundaries (Weber 2012) and 
as rhetorical practices which construct and problematize contributions (Locke et al. 1997). Utility is 
framed as improving scientific rigor or as direct application of theory to practice (Corley et al. 2011). 
These criteria of novelty and utility are commonly framed as properties of an individual piece of research 
and are applied to all research areas to which contributions can be made including theory development, 
deploying a new method, developing research perspectives or design products and processes.  
But neither novelty nor utility is self-evident. Both can only be argued and evaluated in relation to a 
background of accepted knowledge. We therefore argue that contributions are always placed into, and 
evaluated in reference to, the shared commitments or disciplinary matrix (Kuhn 1977) of a scientific 
community.  
This opens the question of how authors persuade us – how we come to find scientific findings believable, 
convincing and compelling of our assent or belief (Rehg 2009). In identifying this persuasiveness or 
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cogency as the “strength or convincing quality of arguments” (Rehg 2009 p. 7) we  open a space to 
provide a refined vocabulary of argument and to provide guidance on crafting individual research projects 
to contribute to scientific discourse.  
To do so, we must identify how a paper becomes persuasive. For example a theory development paper 
develops cogency through survival of critiques and empirical and logical challenges, based on the different 
aspects of argument placed into the discourse. Additional perspectives, new concepts and new evidence 
may be added. These may be considered contributions, by virtue of the dialectic, rhetorical, logical and 
socio-institutional components of arguments that makes the entire disciplinary matrix cogent. For 
instance, the contribution of a literature review paper may be to the dialectic of a discourse around a 
theory, putting different approaches into perspective and relation to each other.  
Second we must first identify to what any research publication contributes. A contribution is only possible 
in relation to the disciplinary matrix from which research is critiqued, challenged, or supported. In our 
theory development example, individual research papers may illustrate an instance of a theory. But these 
instances do not exist in isolation, that is to say, every theory is composed of a set of papers which, taken 
together, presents an argument for a specific account of a phenomenon. This account is understood by 
the community based on the symbolic generalization, models and exemplars, the disciplinary matrix,   
together shared by the community. 
In this research we undertake a first step for understanding contributions to IS research: contribution as 
cogent argumentation and contribution in relation to the disciplinary matrix of scientific communities. 
We first examine how contributions are framed in the literature, arguing that there is no thorough 
engagement with how cogent argumentation for contribution is and can be made. This leads us to expose 
how elements of argumentation relate to the shared commitments of a community to create the cogency 
of an individual paper. Second we shift to the subject of an argumentation as residing in the shared 
commitments of symbolic generalizations, models and exemplars (Kuhn 1977) of communities. We use 
illustrative papers to identify that argumentation for contribution can be grounded in a logical, rhetorical, 
dialectic and socio-institutional framing in relation to the existing exemplars of the community. We 
conclude with a roadmap to advance our research in developing a framework which enables authors, 
reviewers and editors to be clear in establishing the contribution a submission provides and how 
argumentation in submissions can be persuasively articulated. 
Contribution in Research  
The question of a consensual basis for claiming and evaluating intellectual contributions is of increasing 
concern as journals focus on theory and theory building as the highest form of research effort (Avison et 
al. 2014; Straub 2009). A selective review of the management and IS literature indicates that there is 
agreement that “theory papers succeed if they offer important [read useful] and original ideas [read 
novel]” (Kilduff 2007 p. 252; originnal emphasis). As shown in Table 1 the idea that a  contribution “rests 
largely on the ability to provide original insight into a phenomenon by advancing knowledge in a way that 
is deemed to have utility or usefulness for some purpose” (Corley et al. 2011 p. 15) is echoed repeatedly 
across the literature. 
But as categories, novelty and usefulness do not speak for themselves. It is incumbent on researchers “to 
convince their colleagues that their work has value. …. the arguments researchers use to expound their 
theories’ novelty must be crafted carefully; otherwise, their theories’ contribution to knowledge might be 
overlooked” (Corley et al. 2011 p. 14). That argument is essential to understanding how contributions are 
framed as convincing requires us to engage with how authors persuade readers that a research instance 
provides a contribution. We focus on the components of cogent argumentation which articulate an 
intellectual contribution. In this vein, Locke and Golden-Biddle (1997) identify two rhetorical strategies 
that legitimize research through constructing inter textual coherence (disagreement, cumulative progress, 
latent consensus) and problematizing the existing literature (identify gaps, oversights, or alternative 
accounts) to expose opportunities for contributions to knowledge. In identifying that the quality of the 
rhetoric as important in constructing a perception of novelty, Locke and Golden-Biddle (1997) explicate 
one element of argumentation. However, argumentation also involves socio-institutional, logical, and 
dialectic dimensions (Rehg 2009; Toulmin 1958; Wenzel 1990). In this paper we therefore lay out a 
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foundation for argumentation to increase and evaluate the cogency of research. In addition, we identify 
the specific foci of contribution as the disciplinary matrix (Kuhn 1977) shared by a community.. 
Type of 
Contribution Exemplar Statement References 
Novelty “judgments about a theory’s novelty or originality and 
judgments about its contributions to knowledge [are] closely 
related”(Weber 2012 p. 14) 
”improve our understanding of management and 
organizations, whether by offering a critical redirection of 
existing views or by offering an entirely new point of view on 
phenomena”(Conlon 2002 p. 489) 
Colon 2002;  




Weber 2012;  
Gregor 2007 
Straub 2009 
Utility “practical utility is seen as arising when theory can be 
directly applied to the problems practicing managers and 
other organizational practitioners face” (Corley et al. 2011 p. 
18) 
“scientific utility is perceived as an advance that improves 
conceptual rigor or the specificity of an idea and/or enhances 
its potential to be operationalized and tested”(Corley et al. 
2011 p. 17-18) 
Corley and Gioia 
2011; 
Smith 1997;  
Whetten 1990;  
Van de Ven 1989 
 
 
Table 1. Characterizations of Contribution 
The cogency of arguments 
Cogency of arguments is related to rational logical as well as social persuasive aspects: “cogent arguments 
must be supported by good (logical) reasons and defended against (dialectical) challenges in a manner 
(rhetorically) persuasive to their interlocutors,” (Rehg 2009 p. 31). The cogency of arguments therefore 
requires us to consider where and when an argument occurs. Furthermore, the logic of an argument alone 
cannot be considered as persuasive as persuasive arguments must raise a point and make ostensive 
reference to existing claims that are considered to provide a valid ground for argumentation by a 
particular audience. Drawing from argumentation theory, Kuhn’s (1962) insight of the social dimension of 
science and Habermas’ (1984) discourse theory, Rehg (2009) suggests that four dimensions of cogent 
arguments can be distinguished in scientific discourse: logic, dialectic, rhetoric, and social-institutional. 
Logic is concerned with how arguments as products are built. Looking at arguments through the logic 
dimension it is of interest how syntactic and semantic links between premise and conclusion are made. Of 
importance are therefore the “the semantic-syntactic interconnections between reasons and conclusions” 
(Rehg 2009 p. 140). While most philosophy of science classes focus on formal logic, in particular the 
difference between inductive and deductive reasoning, Toulmin (1977) demonstrated that most 
arguments are built on informal logic, such as drawing analogies, inference of best explanation or 
narratives (Rehg 2009). From a logical point of view what is therefore of interest is that arguments are 
clear, relevant, plausible, non-contradicting, consistent in their application of predicates, or that they 
show adequate support for their premises.  This requires considering questions such as: “Does the 
argument overlook relevant information? Are its premises sufficiently precise? Have likely sources of 
error been excluded?” (Rehg 2009 p. 133). While being assessed on their formal merits, arguments as 
products are therefore also related to the dialectic dimension providing the ground on which the syntactic 
and semantic link between premise and conclusion is assessed. Thus the logic of an argument can only be 
considered as robust if it can respond to dialectic challenges. 
The dialectic dimension involves inter-subjective accepted agreements on how arguments can be assessed 
and made, the dialectic dimension therefore provides the rules governing the ‘ritualized competition for 
better arguments’ (Habermas 1984). To be considered cogent arguments need to adhere to ‘dialectic 
standards governing the critical testing of arguments in relation of challenges to argument content’ (Rehg 
2009). The dialectic dimension is thus concerned with the ‘rules standards, attitudes and behaviors that 
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promote critical decision-making’ (Wenzel 1990), cited by Rehg 2009). From the dialectic dimension 
arguments must meet obligations such as: staying on topic, responding to challenges, providing proofs, 
adhering to rules for stating a claim and how claims can be challenged and rebutted. Commonly accepted 
principles for academic argumentation are: that arguments can be expressed without the coercion of 
force; different points of view are allowed participation; and that arguments are based on the non-
deceptiveness of participants. That is argumentation seeks to adhere to an ‘ideal speech situation’ 
(Habermas 1984) asserting that no relevant participants, point of view or relevant contributions are 
suppressed or excluded. The dialectic dimension therefore idealizes conditions in which arguments can be 
critically tested openly and thoroughly by reference to “an audience of competent participants engaged in 
argumentation” (Rehg 2009 p. 135).  
Rhetoric is concerned with the question how a decisive judgement regarding a state of affairs is made. The 
strengths of arguments therefore depends on effective rhetorical presentation in a social-psychological 
sense (Rehg 2009). In other words how is persuasive communication achieved not only by using logical 
devices such as inductive analogy, interference or causal reasoning but also by asserting the audience of 
the competence of the ones making the judgement to be in a position to cast such a judgement. As 
participants in the scientific discourse bring ‘different backgrounds, expertise, assumptions and training ‘ 
to their inquiries they will also differ in their judgement of earlier knowledge and proposed hypotheses 
(Rehg 2009). Generally two standpoints can be taken: assent or dissent where one either accepts and 
continues to build upon, or rejects existing knowledge claims (Locke and Golden-Biddle 1997). To 
convince the audience that a judgement either way is warranted one needs to be regarded as trustworthy 
and positioned to cast a fair-minded judgement. For arguments to be rhetorically effective speakers, 
therefore, need to establish their credibility (ethos) and they need to evoke an emotional response in the 
audience (pathos). A common move associated with ethos is, for instance, by demonstrating that one has 
expertise with a particular method or by showing that one is aware of alternative standpoints. Pathos in 
contrast is achieved, for instance, by appealing to the greater benefit of one’s research outcome or 
standpoint for others, such as practitioners or the IS research community. 
The social institutional dimension is related to social and institutional procedures and rules acting as 
presuppositions for argumentation, it includes “the various social, institutional, and cultural interlocutors 
taken for granted in the process of argumentation” (Rehg 2009 p. 152). The socio-instituational 
dimension therefore relates academic argumentation beyond the dialogical aspects of the dialectic and 
rhetoric dimension to the sustainable social practices governing academic argumentation. Interlocutors of 
the social-institutional dimension form the ‘lifeworld’ of the social order in which academics operate and 
therefore provide normative and factual constrains for argumentation in academic contexts. The socio-
institutional dimension therefore acts as a means to scrutinize the conception and execution of research 
for its dialogical adequacy, such as by requiring blinded peer review, stipulating certain rules for 
discussion at conferences, or requiring fully developed peer-reviewed papers for deciding on what 
research should be presented at a conference. More generally social-institutional aspects are, for instance: 
social relationships, socioeconomic forces, material resources, financing, disciplinary organization, time 
constraints, and institutional mechanisms such recognition of achievements and reputation resulting 
from them. An argument can therefore evoke that a piece of research is undertaken within particular 
constrains (e.g. socioeconomic context) as would be the case when a particular sample size is justified as 
reasonable or when research-in-progress is presented. The merits and demerits of social-institutional 
rules and procedures can be challenged from a dialectic and rhetoric dimension if they are perceived as 
disturbing the communication of reasonable arguments. Socio-institutional conditions thus need to be 
considered as adequate and as not undermining the cogency of arguments. 
Assessing Argumentation for Paper Cogency 
While the description of the aspects of arguments orients us to the concept of cogency, it offers little 
guidance on how such cogency can be practically achieved. Table 2 introduces a list of aspects for each 
dimension of cogency that may be used for assessing whether an argument is cogent. These criteria apply 
to the argumentation made in a particular piece of research and relate the argumentation in a paper to the 
four dimensions of logic, dialectic, rhetoric, and socio-institutional. Rehg’s synthesis of argumentation is 
therefore particularly useful in evaluating the internal consistency of a specific research paper.  
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However, these criteria are limited for understanding how the cogency of a submission can be assessed. 
Scientific contributions do not exist in isolation but rather accrue over time as part of a disciplinary 
matrix. Within the general scientific discourse, Kuhn (Kuhn 1977) disclosed that communities of 
researchers are the locus of a disciplinary matrix representing the commitments and acceptance of 
exemplars, manifestations of analogies and metaphors, research heuristics, methods of problem solving, 
illustrations, and research instruments. Kuhn more precisely articulates this disciplinary matrix as the 
symbolic generalization sketches, models and exemplars shared by a community. As novelty and 
usefulness can only be evaluated in light of existing knowledge, argumentation for contribution made by 
any submission refers to at least one aspect of the disciplinary matrix. Therefore the internal argument 
dimensions in the paper must point outward and persuade the community that the research strengthens 
the disciplinary matrix which they share. 
Dimensions of 
cogency Exemplary aspects of cogency 
Logic • Relevance (is relevant information overlooked?) 
• Plausibility (Are premises sufficiently precise?) 
• Non-contradiction and consistency 
• Support for premises 
Dialectic • Providing proofs for claims 
• Acknowledging other views and contributions 
• Creating, considering and responding to challenges 
• Engaging in critical assessment 
Rhetoric • Clear reference how research assents or dissents on earlier work 
• Sufficiently demonstrate expertise in used methods and theories 
• Appeal to benefit the research community in IS and beyond 
• Appeal to benefit practice and society 
Social -Institutional • Unbiased - peer review 
• Acknowledge limitations due to socioeconomic and material resources 
• Appeal to prestige/expertise/reputation 
• Acknowledge reputation and achievements of others 
Table 2. Dimensions of Argumentation (Rehg 2009) 
Extending Rehg’s conceptualization of argumentation, we can demonstrate how contributions are made 
by relating a paper ‘outwards’ to the disciplinary matrix. Our approach is based on differentiating 
scientific discourse into intertwined but analytically distinguishable levels: a paper level, the disciplinary 
matrix level, the discipline level and the institutional level (Figure 1). As indicated in Figure 1, each paper 
(P1, P2, Pn)  pertains to one of the aspects of the disciplinary matrix of the community to which the authors 
intends to contribute. 
 
Figure 1. Locating Contribution 
As we argued above, the contribution of each paper can only be evaluated in relation to the disciplinary 
matrix to which it relates (e.g. Disciplinary Matrix A). Each individual paper, therefore, must contribute to 
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the logic, dialectic, rhetoric, or socio-institutional aspects of the cogency of the argumentation of the 
disciplinary matrix. Although each individual paper contains all the elements of argumentation (Table 2), 
a paper which provides a contribution does so by increasing the cogency of one (or several) dimensions of 
the argument of which the disciplinary matrix is constructed. That is Rehg’s four dimension of cogency 
not only apply at the paper level, but they also apply at the disciplinary matrix level. Or to phrase is 
differently a paper makes a contribution because it enhances the cogency of the disciplinary matrix by 
strengthening its logic, dialectic, rhetoric or socio-institutional dimensions. We now use Rehg’s elements 
of argumentation to assess how argumentation is made in two exemplar papers. 
Translating Argumentation to the Disciplinary Matrix 
The following section demonstrates that the dimensions of argumentation in an individual paper translate 
to the disciplinary matrix. We have selected two papers that illustrate how authors argue for contribution 
to substantiate our claim that authors can frame their research as contributing to the overall disciplinary 
matrix. Space permitting we chose one paper that demonstrates that authors can frame their research as 
contributing to the dialectic dimension (Lee et al. 2009) and one paper that demonstrates how authors 
may choose to frame their contribution in regard to the socio-institutional dimension (Hirschheim et al. 
2012). 
In our first example, we observe that Lee and Hubona (2013) pursue the idealized condition in which 
arguments within research can be tested critically, openly, and thoroughly. They address one, if not the 
outstanding challenge to researchers to provide “fundamental principles of logic in general and scientific 
reasoning in particular” (ibid abstract). Although the paper addresses specific logical forms in scientific 
reasoning, the contribution of the paper resides in the dialectic challenge to the taken-for-granted 
assumptions of IS research regarding symbolic generalization. 
Vignette 1– Excerpts from Lee and Hubona (2013) 
“There is a need to initiate a new direction in the ongoing development of research methods in the 
information systems discipline. Currently, in positivist information systems research, there is an 
emphasis on developing increasingly rigorous methodological techniques that address formative 
validity (that is, increasingly rigorous ways of measuring ßi and testing for the statistical significance of 
its estimated value, bi). However, there is no less of a need to develop rigorous techniques for 
empirically testing an overall theory so as to establish its summative validity (ibid p 248) […] 
interpretive information systems research has also concentrated on the development of research 
methods that address formative validity and, therefore, also needs to turn some attention to the task of 
developing research methods for addressing summative validity (ibid p 256) […] but a call for the 
conscientious application of such logic in empirical inquiry is new (ibid 257) […] the notions of 
formative validity and summative validity affirm what these streams of research have already 
accomplished, as well as point to what remains to be done.” (ibid p 257) 
 
In identifying the potential for creating ambiguity as linguistic descriptions are transformed into 
mathematical representations, the authors bring into focus the potential for multiple interpretations of a 
theory. In their example, as linguistic theoretical statements are transformed into mathematical form [a 
symbolic generalization sketch as in Y=f(X1, X2..Xn)], there is an assumption of a linear relationship that is 
not present in the linguistic form. Thus Lee and Hubona identify that researchers can create a more 
cogent argument by disclosing the rational for the selected transformational cuts and providing the 
implications of alternatives. In addition, the relation between data fitting and model testing is crucial (the 
timing of the transformational cuts) as one provides a more cogent logical argument. In addition, the 
author(s) contribute a logical element to the discourse by disclosing the need to test hypotheses, not 
merely fit data, and suggest prediction intervals as a suitable approach for strengthening hypothesis-
testing research. 
Our second illustrative paper demonstrates that research can contribute broadly to the disciplinary matrix 
by increasing the cogency of research efforts through the socio-institutional aspect of argumentation. 
Vignette 2 summarizes key sections from Hirschheim and Klein (2012) that exemplify how the authors 
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frame their paper to contribute to cogency of the disciplinary matrix by advancing it’s the socio-
institutional dimension:  
Vignette 1– Excerpts from Hirschheim and Klein (2012) 
“[O]ur position is a simple one – that it is important for IS researchers to have at least some form of 
shared understanding of the short history of our field; that is, the major intellectual waves that shaped 
our perspectives. […] a historical reflection […] can provide an essential foundation for a broader 
dialogue for those in – or wishing to join – the field.” (ibid p 190). A historical look at the field “could 
contribute to improving communication among diverse scholarly communities and to establishing a 
social identity for IS as a field. […] Our goals in excavating the partly forgotten influences of the past are 
twofold: first, to propose a structure for “institutional memory” [… that] can function as a map to the 
origins of diverse communities. The memory structure and contents can also provide basic concepts, 
meanings, and exemplars for addressing communication gaps by encouraging sense-making between 
those communities – it is a vehicle for ‘connecting the dots’. […] Once the institutional memory is 
accepted and continually maintained, it can serve a second major objective, which is to create a 
conveniently accessible teaching tool for socializing the next generation of IS academics into the 
community. […] Collectively, the insights derived from an historical analysis are a prerequisite for IS 
researchers to make informed judgments (not to mention to engage in a discourse across the many 
specializations), about the scope of IS research and teaching and where the field could and should go in 
the future. Given what to us seems such an obvious need, it is somewhat surprising that the discipline 
of IS has few published reflective pieces tracing the historical roots of the field. […] Whatever the case, 
we believe this to be a serious shortcoming of the IS discipline, and one which this article attempts to 
address."(ibid p 192, emphasis added) 
 
As vignette 2 highlights, Hirschheim and Klein (2012) frame their individual paper as socio-institutional 
argumentation for historical analysis of the creation of models and exemplars of the discipline. The 
disagreement in the IS community regarding what IS is about and where it should go may be overcome by 
looking back at what IS has achieved and what models and exemplars were of interest to IS research in the 
past. The authors argue that the commitments of the community can be strengthened by their historical 
analysis of the literature. 
Both illustrations above highlight that Rehg’s dimensions of argumentation can be used in analyzing how 
authors argue for the contribution of a paper as they relate their research to the disciplinary matrix. Our 
analysis demonstrates the value of using Rehg’s framework for better understanding how papers can be 
formulated, framed, and assessed as increasing cogency and therefore as a contribution.  
Concluding Discussion 
Nature does not speak for itself and it is through discursive and material argumentation that scientific 
discourse becomes persuasive and compelling of belief – how it gains cogency. Prior research frames 
contributions in terms of novelty or utility (Colon 2002; Corley and Gioia 2011; Gregor 2007; Locke and 
Golden-Biddle 1997; Smith 1997; Weber 2012; Whetten 1990; Van de Ven 1989). However, this framing 
does not address how readers are persuaded that a specific paper is novel or useful or to what a paper 
contributes. Therefore novelty and utility per se provide limited guidance to researchers in formulating 
argumentation for claims to contribution. They are also of limited use to editors and reviewers for 
evaluating claims of contribution. Although Locke and Golden-Biddle (1997) frame contributions in terms 
of rhetorical strategies, argumentation theory (Habermas 1984; Rehg 2009; Toulmin 1958) provide a 
richer analysis of cogency. 
The cogency of scientific practice can be viewed through Rehg’s (2009) development of Habermas’s four 
dimensions of ideal argument: logical, dialectic, rhetorical, and socio-institutional. Although these 
dimensions and the elements which constitute them can be discerned within individual papers, 
contributions can only be made in relation to a community’s disciplinary matrix. Each disciplinary matrix 
is bounded by the commitments to exemplars, models and symbolic generalization together held by 
researchers of the community into which the argument is placed. The disciplinary matrix itself can be 
understood as argumentation in which individual papers collectively reinforce the shared commitments of 
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the community. This analysis opens up the space for understanding contribution made by a particular 
research paper as contributing to the cogency of the disciplinary matrix. Examples presented include: Lee 
and Hubona (2013) to illustrate how authors can frame the contribution of their paper in terms of the 
dialectic dimension of argumentation and Hirschheim and Klein (2012), who provide an illustration a 
socio-institutional argument to frame identification of a disciplines models and exemplars. Through these 
cases we illustrate how the dimensions of argumentation operate to persuade the community that a 
specific paper makes a contribution to the disciplinary matrix.  
Looking Ahead 
The overall goal of our research is to develop a framework of argumentation that will enable a better 
understanding of contributions to scientific discourse. Looking forward we seek to develop our research 
by expanding on illustrative papers to demonstrate how our framework for understanding argumentation 
can help in identifying aspects of contribution cogency in exemplar papers. In addition we also seek to 
examine the other side of cogency by identifying elements in review reports of rejected papers to analyze 
the claims for lack of cogency of their argumentation. Thus we seek to demonstrate how our framework 
can be used to identify how papers fail in being cogent to reviewers. This analysis will also highlight the 
role of rhetorical and dialectical aspects of argument in the discursive development of contributions 
during the exchange of ideas in the review process among authors, editors and reviewers. Of particular 
interest here is the stabilization and challenge to the symbolic generalizations, models and exemplars of 
the disciplinary matrix of a community though argumentation practices. 
Once completed, our framework will help authors to argue their contribution more clearly. As noted by 
Stanley (2004) papers provide a textual focus for argument, requires consensus among researchers, 
reviewers and editors, and  affords a way of organizing critical deliberation. Thus specific attention to the 
relation between elements of argumentation in a paper and the broader disciplinary matrix can focus the 
research presentation in a paper. Furthermore, the envisaged framework will also provide guidance to 
reviewers and editors to assess contributions. For example, the element of logic requires that the cogency 
of the argument is influenced by the force of the claimed contribution in relation to shared commitments. 
That is, a discovery claim (e.g. a claim to a new theory) requires more stringent evidentiary argument than 
an evidence claim supporting a theory addition or reproduction. 
Conclusion 
Recognizing the requirements of argumentation enables authors and reviewers to produce more cogent 
arguments and better assess submissions for contribution to the community. Furthermore, recognizing 
argumentation as an intellectual practice may challenge the format of conferences and publications in IS. 
For example, the element of dialectic invokes the claim that cogent arguments should stand up in open 
debate. Yet as a discipline, few contributions are debated, rather they are commented on and shaped by 
editors and reviewers in a process that is inaccessible by the wider IS community. In addition, the 
dialectic aspect of contributions can be based on identifying the diversity of views in understanding a 
particular phenomenon, or by disclosing the contribution of a landscape of intersecting research areas 
using a framework, taxonomy or typology for orientation. Finally, this research suggests that attention to 
the argument of a paper relative to the disciplinary matrix allows for other types of contributions. As 
argued by Avison and Malaurent (2014), Shapira (2011) and Hambrick (2007), business disciplines risk 
“fetishizing” theory at the expense of moving into unexplored “blue ocean” intellectual territory (Straub 
2009). Recognition of the cogency of science resulting from all aspects of argument relative to the entire 
matrix of commitment shared within and between communities sensitizes authors to the need for 
rhetorical and dialectic connections to the appropriate aspects of the scientific discourse. It highlights the 
institution of science itself and creates awareness for reviewers to attend to the contribution of the 
research to the scientific discourse, rather than merely to novelty or utility of a paper. 
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